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that have occurred in Southeast Asia
or off Nigeria) in terms of state failure,
and counterpiracy as the maximization
by states of their competitive advantage
over other states in an international
system where material capabilities are
changing. For its part, neoliberalism argues that states seek to create norms and
shape them through international institutions. These facilitate cooperation and
enable states to act through them under
international law, albeit for self-interested
reasons. Exponents of this theory see
United Nations action and UN Security
Council resolutions as reflecting the
aims and objectives of their sponsoring
powers. It also explains why so many developmental initiatives have foundered
within Somalia—because they seek to
aid the creation of a Western-style liberal
democracy rather than political arrangements that may align more closely with
Somali political and clan structures.
However, the book under review also
collects a number of essays articulating
a third approach, called constructivism.
That theory departs from state-centric,
rationalist approaches to suggest that
social processes, including norms
other than international ones, as well
as issues of identity, inform security
interests across a range of players and
shape their actions accordingly.
This collection focuses particularly
on the topic of global governance, a
construct that places particular emphasis on institutions and regimes (in this
case security regimes) and implies that
international institutions are actors in
their own right. In this view, these actors
have objectives that are often different
from those of their member states and
that in turn shape the behavior of those
states and of nonstate actors. Interestingly, and rightly, it takes the view that
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because piracy occurs in a space outside
territorially bounded state authority,
maritime depredation asks profound
questions about who exactly decides
what is right and wrong, and why.
Several contributors make the point
that differences between state responses to piracy reveal governance
gaps in the interstate system, gaps that
pirates have exploited—and states too,
a point emphasizing the indissoluble
connection between piracy and state
action. The role of international law
comes under particular scrutiny. Legal
discourse has played a crucial role
in framing the piracy problem in the
modern era, arguably at the expense of
political and economic approaches.
In the end, this important and useful
book asks everyone with an interest
or a role in piracy issues to confront
questions that affect all users of the
sea, military and civilian. Are we
witnessing the end of an old regime,
the reactivation of old legal mechanisms, or the development of a global
governance regime based on international institutions? Moreover, where
will this process end and will notions
of universal jurisdiction, and perhaps
global citizenship, spread out from their
current enclaves and touch us all?
MARTIN MURPHY

Alexandria, Virginia

Anderson, Scott. Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly, and the Making of the Modern
Middle East. New York: Doubleday, 2013. 592pp.
$28.95

As the subtitle suggests, the First World
War, with its unintended consequences,
unbridled imperial ambitions, and a

1

138

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 2, Art. 16

complicated maze of duplicitous dealings among untrusting allies, underlies
the making of the modern Middle East.
One could easily add martial lunacy
to this list of horribles, as this brief but
highly relevant treatment of Britain’s
mismanagement of the Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, and Gaza campaigns will attest.
None of this is news, but the topic has
garnered a great deal of attention in
recent years. Anderson covers the familiar ground well, outlining the political,
diplomatic, military, and economic
drivers of imperial ambitions as the
Western allies plotted the dismantling of
the Ottoman Empire. In telling this tale
Anderson discusses the usual suspects:
Mark Sykes, Henry McMahon, King
Husayn, Faisal ibn Husayn, Lord Kitchener, and a host of others. More interestingly, however, he ties in as well a number of important players who generally
get short shrift. The German diplomats
Max von Oppenheim and Curt Prufer
are major players in the story. So too is
Djemel Pasha, the Turkish governor of
Syria. The role of the American William
Yale, first as an officer of Standard Oil
Company of New York and later as a
special agent for the State Department,
is also significant, if only for beginning a
ninety-five-year tradition of fundamentally misreading the region. Finally, the
importance of Aaron Aaronsohn and his
Zionist spy ring that supported British
operations in Palestine receives its due.
Anderson’s T. E. Lawrence is a complicated and enigmatic man who “seemed
intent on baffling” historians. Noting his many admirable and not-soadmirable qualities, Anderson neither
praises nor condemns but rather tries
to understand this hugely talented but
ultimately unsuccessful man. Relying heavily but not uncritically on
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Lawrence’s writings, Anderson attributes
his tactical, operational, and essentially
political-military successes to brilliance,
timing, and sheer luck—the latter largely
owing to his managing to avoid the
consequences of having infuriated any
number of very senior officers. Anderson portrays well the tension caused
for Lawrence by the duplicity of British
and French diplomacy vis-à-vis the
Arab uprising between his loyalty to
Britain and his sense of personal honor.
Among the cast of dishonest brokers
Anderson paints as the worst Mark
Sykes, a brilliant but unprincipled dilettante with no apparent compunction
against lying to his own government or
to Britain’s allies. Working diligently to
advance Britain’s imperial interests by
managing the flow of (and often inventing) information, Sykes accumulated
a great deal of responsibility for the
postwar mess that was and remains the
Middle East. Others contributing to the
mess are a whole bevy of senior British
and French officials, and also Woodrow
Wilson, whose profound ignorance,
idealism, and arrogance opened a
Pandora’s box of ethnic and nationalist
desires that still smolder throughout the
region. As for the Arabs, often portrayed
as victims, they seem here not to have
been as gullible as it may appear. Citing
Husayn’s and Faisal’s not-alwaysaboveboard diplomacy, aided by Lawrence’s unauthorized revelation of the
secret Sykes-Picot agreement, Anderson
argues that the Arabs were not exactly
“rubes” when it came to power politics.
A journalist by trade, Scott Anderson
is a frequent contributor to a variety of
periodicals and the author of two novels
and several books of nonfiction. His bibliography is extensive, but the paucity in
it of Arab and Turkish sources is notable.
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In addition, his use of nonstandard notations can render specific citations a little
fuzzy. This is a minor issue, however,
as Anderson’s synthesis is superb, his
analysis is sharp, and his writing style is
engaging. All in all, this is a very useful
contribution to the body of work, one
that helps foster a better understanding
of the dynamics shaping today’s Arab
Spring and beyond. Given America’s
track record in the region, anything that
helps broaden our understanding of the
Middle East can only be a good thing.
THOMAS E. SEAL, COLONEL, U.S. MARINE CORPS,
RETIRED

Stafford, Virginia

Boscawen, Hugh. The Capture of Louisbourg,
1758. Campaigns and Commanders. Norman:
Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 2011. 504pp. $39.95

The British amphibious operation to
capture the French fortress at Louisbourg in Canada during the Seven Years’
War was the largest joint operation undertaken by British forces in that period.
This major event in naval history has
not been overlooked by historians, but
no one until Colonel Hugh Boscawen,
British Army (Ret.), has been able so
effectively to combine the skills of an experienced army officer with those of an
insightful modern historian in analyzing
this campaign and its commanders.
A direct descendant of the British naval
commander at the capture of Louisbourg, Admiral the Honorable Edward
Boscawen, Colonel Hugh Boscawen
brings his own experience of thirty years
of active military service in the Coldstream Guards to bear on the subject,
with his knowledge of modern-day
campaign planning and execution. Such
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credentials might have led an author
in the wrong direction, resulting in an
anachronistic and hagiographic tale full
of modern military jargon. However, in
Hugh Boscawen’s hands they have led
to a model of careful historical scholarship informed by professional military
understanding, experience at sea as a
yachtsman, and access to family papers.
Starting out from the key conceptual
point that campaigns and commanders should be seen in the context of the
aims, ways, and means of their own day,
Boscawen has carefully and judiciously
examined the subject. Over many years,
he made a thorough study of both the
published English- and the published
French-language scholarship. Going
much farther and deeper, he examined
in detail the extensive public and private
records in four French and eight British
archival depositories, as well as other
primary-source materials in Canada,
the United States, and private hands.
Colonel Boscawen opens his study with
an overview of the strategic situation
that the competing powers of Britain
and France faced in the period immediately leading up to 1758, and of the
contrasting organization of those governments and their leaders. Boscawen
goes on to examine the background to
the construction of the French fortification at Louisbourg, ranging from the
reorganization of the defense of New
France following the Peace of Utrecht
in 1713 to the perception on both
sides that Louisbourg had become an
important trading point, the key bastion
in the defense of the Saint Lawrence
River and Quebec, as well as the French
fisheries on the Grand Banks. When
war broke out again between the two
countries in 1755, neither was immediately prepared to react decisively.
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